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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-3187 
 ___________ 
 
WINGATE INNS INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Delaware 
Corporation, successor in interest to HOTEL Franchising  
Partnership doing business as WINGATE INNS, L.P. 
 
 v. 
 
HIGHTECH INN.COM, LLC, and Oregon Limited Liability Company; 
ENGINEERING DESIGN CORPORATION, an Oregon Corporation; 
SHANTU N. SHAH, an individual; BAKULESH PATEL, an individual 
 
SHANTU N. SHAH, an individual, 
  Third Party Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
BUGGSI HOSPITALITY GROUP, LLC, an Oregon Limited  
Liability Company; RAJU PATEL, Chief Financial Officer of  
Buggsi Hospitality, an individual, ROBERT LOEWEN,  
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of  
Wyndham Group, LLC, an individual, 
  Third Party Defendants 
 
SHANTUN N. SHAH,  
                               Appellant 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the District of New Jersey 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 07-cv-05014) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Garrett E. Brown, Jr. 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 23, 2011 
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 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: May 26, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Shantu N. Shah, proceeding pro se, appeals from the order of the District Court 
denying his motion for reconsideration and for default judgment and granting defendants‟ 
motion to dismiss.  For the following reasons, we will affirm.     
I. 
In October 2007, Wingate Inns International, Inc.  (“Wingate”) filed a complaint 
in District Court against Hightech Inn.com, LLC (“Hightech”) and Bakulesh Patel 
(“Bakulesh”) seeking to recover damages owed under a settlement agreement reached 
after an alleged breach of a franchise agreement.  Wingate also alleged that Shah was 
secondarily liable for the damages.  Shah answered the complaint and filed counterclaims 
against Wingate, cross-claims against Hightech and Bakulesh, and a third-party 
complaint against Buggsi Hospitality Group, LLC (“Buggsi”), Raju Patel (“Raju”), and 
Robert Loewen (“Loewen”) (collectively “the defendants”).  He alleged claims arising 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (substantive RICO claim), 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (conspiracy to 
commit a violation under § 1962), Or. Rev. Stat. § 166.720 (Oregon RICO), N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:41-2 (New Jersey RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (Hobbs Act), 18 U.S.C. § 666 
(theft or bribery involving federal funds), and common law breach of fiduciary duty. 
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In April 2008, Wingate‟s claims against Hightech and Bakulesh were dismissed, 
following a settlement agreement.   
Pursuant to Shah‟s motions, the District Court entered default against Hightech 
and Bakulesh in April 2008, and against Buggsi and Raju in May 2008, for failure to 
appear.  In June 2008, upon defense counsel‟s motion, the court vacated the default 
against Hightech and Bakulesh and granted a motion to allow all of the defendants to join 
a motion to dismiss filed by Loewen and Wingate.  In May 2009, Shah filed another 
request for entry of default against the defendants because they entered appearances late 
in the action. 
In December 2008, the District Court granted Loewen‟s motion to dismiss Shah‟s 
third-party complaint.  The court granted Shah two thirty-day extensions to file an 
amended third-party complaint.  Shah did not file the amended complaint, but eventually 
filed a motion for reconsideration. 
In December 2009, the court vacated the default against Raju.  On the same day, 
the District Court denied Shah‟s motion for reconsideration of its order dismissing his 
claims against Loewen and granted Wingate‟s motion for judgment on the pleadings.1  
The court granted Shah leave to amend his mail and wire fraud claims within thirty-days.  
In January 2010, the District Court denied Shah‟s motions for entry of default against the 
defendants and entry of default judgment against Buggsi.  Instead of re-filing his mail 
and wire fraud claims, Shah filed another motion for entry of default judgment against 
                                                 
1
 Hightech, Bakulesh, and Raju joined the motion. 
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Buggsi and Raju and a motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his claims 
against Wingate.   
On June 21, 2010, the District Court denied Shah‟s motions for reconsideration 
and for default judgment, and granted the remaining defendants‟ (Hightech, Bakulesh, 
Raju, and Buggsi) motion to dismiss.  Shah filed a timely notice of appeal.  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
II. 
A. Motion for Reconsideration 
We review a denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse of discretion, while 
reviewing the District Court‟s underlying legal determinations de novo and its factual 
determinations for clear error.  Max‟s Seafood Café ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 
176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir. 1999).  A motion for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) must 
rely on one of three grounds:  (1) an intervening change in the law; (2) the availability of 
new evidence; or (3) the need to correct clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.  
N. River Ins. Co. v. CIGNA Reinsurance Co., 52 F.3d 1194, 1218 (3d Cir. 1995).   
The District Court granted Wingate‟s motion for judgment on the pleadings, 
finding that Shah did not allege facts sufficient to sustain a RICO claim (under federal or 
state laws) or a conspiracy under the federal RICO statute.
2
  In his motion, Shah asked 
the District Court to reconsider its decision in light of Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494 
(2000), which he claimed overruled Lightning Lube v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
2
 In addition, the court determined that Shah‟s breach of fiduciary duty claim was merely 
an unsupported conclusory allegation.  The court also found that Shah lacked standing to 
prosecute criminal acts under the Hobbs Act or the federal theft or bribery statutes.   
5 
 
1993) and constituted a change in RICO law.  For substantially the reasons stated by the 
District Court, this argument is without merit.  Accordingly, we conclude that the District 
Court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider.    
B. Renewed Motion for Default Judgment 
We review a denial of a motion for default judgment for abuse of discretion.  
Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154, 164 (3d Cir. 2000).  A District Court considers 
whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if default is denied, whether the defendant 
appears to have a litigable defense, and whether the defendant‟s delay is due to culpable 
conduct.  Id.  Shah argues that Buggsi filed “late answers or appearances without an 
excusable reason.”  However, as the District Court found, late filing and appearances 
cannot stand as the basis for a default judgment.  Accordingly, the District Court properly 
denied default judgment. 
C. Motion to Dismiss 
  Our review of a District Court‟s order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary.  
See Santiago v. GMAC Mortgage Group, Inc., 417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005).  “To 
survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted 
as true, to „state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. 
Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must determine whether the complaint “pleads 
factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is 
liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Id.   
 The District Court found that Shah failed to state a claim for relief under Federal 
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Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  To survive dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint 
must contain more than “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, 
supported by mere conclusory statements.”  Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949.  His claims against 
the moving defendants (Hightech, Bakulesh, Raju, and Buggsi) were the same as those he 
raised against Wingate.  As stated above, the District Court found that Shah failed to 
allege sufficient facts to establish a pattern of racketeering, conspiracy under the RICO 
statute, or any breach of fiduciary duty.  The court properly concluded that the same 
findings applied to Shah‟s claims against the moving defendants.  Thus, we agree that 
Shah filed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 
III. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court‟s judgment.3  Shah‟s 
motion to strike Appellee‟s brief and index is denied. 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Shah‟s motion to file a second reply brief is granted.  We considered both of his reply 
briefs in reaching our decision. 
